Latouche, D. “The Canadian Rebellion of 1992 : 
The Wind From The East” The New Federation 3.1 (1992): 16-99.

The Canadian Rebellion of 1992 : The Wind From The East 
by Daniel Latouche

Last August Canadians found out for themselves what they had long suspected: their constitutional crisis was not the most important event taking place in the world. For a few precious days, the issue almost disappeared from view as Yeltsin and Gorbachev replaced Mulroney and Parizeau on the front pages. Suddenly, Estonia was more important than Quebec. It was a relief and no one complained. But, in addition to a short reprise from our constitutional melodrama, did we learn anything from the momentous developments affecting the Soviet Union?
It did not take long for Canadian politicians to seize on these headlines to support their favourite interpretations of where Canadian politics was going. The Prime Minister was quick to point out that the Canadian process of constitutional change was a peaceful one and that only the most distorted minds could imply that what was good for Latvia and the Ukraine was also good for Quebec. Nationalist leaders in the former "Belle Province" immediately replied that if the Prime Minister was so nervous, then it was surely the case that the Baltics were indeed relevant.
They were both right, but mostly for the wrong reasons. The failed putsch in the Soviet Union and the accelerated events in the Baltic states clearly show that when a political order starts crumbling, there is no way to stop it. Last-minute efforts to reorient events will only precipitate them as they force everyone to take sides and therefore reduce considerably the margin to maneuver available to leaders. The failed coup put an end to thousands of hours of debate. Formerly credible options, such as the democratization of the Communist Party, quickly disappeared from the map of possibilities and were seen for what they had been from the start: castles in the sand.
But the Soviet case also testifies to the difficulties involved in trying to rescue political leaders from the various corners where they have painted themselves.
In a perceptive article published in Le Devoir, Pierre Graveline of l'Universite de Montréal wrote that the loss of credibility of our political actors threatens the very structure of our institutions. Political commentators in English Canada talk openly of an existential crisis.
Can it be that federal leaders, obsessed as they are with their latest strategies to placate Quebec, are missing the writing on the wall, just as Mr. Gorbachev failed to see that by trying to co-opt his opponents, he was only weakening his own position making it impossible for his real allies to continue working with him? Could it be that the Quebec issue is only part of a much more global one?
In Atlantic Canada, premiers are seriously considering the possibility of integrating the three provincial economies into one single Atlantic economy. Clearly, small increases in the Regional Expansion Fund or better unemployment coverage are no longer considered realistic solutions. The election of anti-bilingualism MLAs from the Confederation of Regions Party (CORE) in New Brunswick also confirmed that minor adjustments to the Official Languages Act will not satisfy those Canadians who feel that officially sanctioned bilingualism is divisive, costly and ineffective.
In the West, farmers face the most serious threat to their livelihoods since modern farming began. Potentially more serious even than the crisis of the Great Depression. The raison d'etre of the Prairies is threatened. In two provinces, the electorate has decided to experiment with new governing parties and even the threat of an Ontario-like deficit seems to have no effect on B.C. voters. 
Everywhere, change is the order of the day. Not the kind of change where a society feels it has a better chance with a new party or with a new policy, but change brought about by desperation when everything else has failed. The rising audience of the Reform Party is further testimony to the fact that Canadian voters, in West and East, feel they do not have any other choice but to move on to different political pastures. Old-style executive federalism is being pushed aside by wide-spread calls for a constituent assembly.
Even in the normally staid academic community, some scholars have broken ranks and are supporting radical "let-Quebec-go" options in books such as Deconfederation and English Canada Speaks Out.
The sense of urgency and desperation was first indicated by the defeat of the Peterson Government, signaling the rising unpredictability of Ontario – and Canadian – politics. It raises the question of whether or not Canada has enough time on its hands. Like Mr. Gorbachev, does the country believe it can finesse itself out of so many crises, playing one group against another, working on one issue while keeping the others at bay?
Events in the Soviet Union have confirmed that once democratic forces for change are unleashed they cannot be put back in the bottle. Among Western countries, Canada is unique in the strength of the forces that are directed at the overthrow of the established order. All have yet to run their full course. There is Quebec of course, always Quebec, but there is also the West and Atlantic Canada, the Native People and the ordinary Canadians who, on both sides of the linguistic divide, stand united in their distaste for the way politicians have conducted political affairs. For a brief moment in the summer of 1990, in the wake of the Oka crisis, the Canadian Army was actually the most popular institution in the country! With each drop in the polls – for the Prime Minister and his ability to govern, and in the level of respect for our political institutions – Canada moves a step closer towards recognizing the need for a massive reorganization of all of its public life. Even if Joe Clark became leader he would have to proceed to drastic reforms, starting with his own party.
But the lessons from the Eastern Bloc do not stop at constitutional match-making. In the end Boris Yeltsin won not because of the few tanks he commanded, but because he had the people's trust. Russians even trusted him to the point of taking him on his word that President Gorbachev has come out of the crisis a new man. What political leader in Canada could pretend to such a level of trust?
While Quebec society presents many of the same symptoms as English Canada, it harbours a more explosive situation. The Parti Quebecois has never been in a better position take power again. There are a number of reasons for this. The economic argument is no longer one-sided, and business leaders no longer form the monolithic bloc they did during the 1980 Referendum Campaign. But, more important, Pierre Trudeau has departed along with French Power: such men as Marchand, Lalonde, Pelletier (not to mention the younger Chrétien and Ouellet), who held so much influence over the course of' Quebec politics. On the other side of the ledger, Mulroney stands alone and discredited. His lieutenants, Benoit Bouchard and Marcel Masse, are committed nationalists and lack the motivation to fight for Canada. In fact, the federalists have been without a strong presence in Quebec for over a decade, and this has taken its toll. Even the idea of federalism does not carry the same intellectual weight as before when one regularly hears of recent barbaric attacks by the, so-called "federal," Serbian Army against Dubrovnic.
Quebec indépendentist leaders can now claim that recent history is on their side. Jacques Parizeau, for one, can claim to have stayed the course. The lessons of recent Soviet events have not been lost on him. He and Lucien Bouchard – both experienced cabinet ministers – are seen as men of integrity, willing to sacrifice short-term gains and career objectives for an ideal. Their combined assets make them stronger than René Lévesque in his prime.
They will campaign on the belief that the Canadian economic space should be preserved at all costs, and that only a strong nationalist presence in Ottawa will bring the rest of the country to the negotiation table. Together they form a strong and possibly winning combination. It is difficult to imagine any countervailing winning combination in the federalist camp.
While the quality of our leaders is a critical issue, the forces in Quebec are also being driven by a historical agenda (which has been supported by successive premiers since the Quiet Revolution) based on a new division of powers. This agenda has been given a new impetus with the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the subsequent all-party Belanger-Campeau Commission and the Allaire Report. The Allaire Report will take on a lot more significance and will likely become to Quebeckers what the democratization of the Communist Party was to the citizens of the Soviet Union. It is the bottom line which leaders can only ignore at their peril. But the Parti Quebecois does not believe that Bourassa can deliver on this issue or negotiate Quebec's historic claim to its veto.
Already, despite the attempt to rescue the Beaudoin-Dobbie Parliamentary Committee with the backup plan of five conferences, the indépendentist leaders are busy laying the ground – and in some cases the ground covered is surprisingly new – for the post-independence age. At their mid-September National Council meeting, péquiste leaders went out of their way to convince English Quebeckers that there is ample room for them in a sovereign Quebec. There were even suggestions that the much despised linguistic laws could be abolished, and sooner than later, as a sovereign Quebec could use other means, those available to any "normal" nation-state, to ensure its cultural survival. Bill 178 would probably be one of the first to go as the new government tries to reassure both the anglophone and international communities that a sovereign Quebec is to be a normal nation-state and not an ethnic one.
As a Permanent Member of the U.N. Security Council, France is the most likely candidate to introduce a resolution welcoming the new country within the community of nations. Lucien Bouchard, a former Ambassador in Paris, could play a significant role in convincing the Quai d'Orsay that such a move could only benefit France and would probably not hurt it in the rest of Canada. Although one cannot expect Canada to rejoice or even support the resolution, there is very little it can do, short of calling on the United States to veto such a resolution. It is doubtful that the United States would want to intervene to that extent in the matter, even to please an old friend.
In the areas of justice, environmental protection and human rights, a high level of legal and legislative continuity is to be expected. A new deal would have to be established with Quebec’s Native Peoples. The Quebec National Assembly has already recognized the national status of Native groups as well as their right to self-government within their territory. How this recognition would be articulated with the need to preserve the integrity of the new nation-state remains to be seen, but both sides have an incentive to arrive quickly at an understanding.
Of course, Mr. Bourassa could still derail many of the well-laid plans of the nationalist leaders. A dramatic renewal of the Mulroney-Bourassa alliance may offer some hope. But, by law, he is mandated to call a referendum by October 1992 on either a firm constitutional package from the rest of Canada or on Quebec's accession to a sovereign status. By agreeing to such constraints, he has limited his own margin of freedom, thus effectively painting himself into a corner. But by doing so, he has already succeeded in pressing the federal government and the other provinces to come up with a challenging constitutional package. But, in the end, he and his increasingly nationalist government stand alone in defining both the substance and the symbolism of a Quebec referendum. There are many ways one can ask a question on sovereignty. Some of these ways imply not so much the immediate and irrevocable break-up of Canada, but a serious attempt at political reconstruction of the country, much along the lines of the Allaire Report.
There is also the possibility of Mr. Mulroney calling a June referendum-type election to gain support for his Constitutional renewal plan. No doubt his electoral fortunes would be helped if he succeeded in presenting himself and his Party as Canada's last chance. But would such a last-minute maneuver have any credibility.
Again, it is not difficult to draw a parallel between the Canadian and the Soviet situation. What we do not yet know in Canada is whether Canada is already, or has been ever since the failure of the Meech Lake deal, in a post-coup situation, or if we are still building castles in the sand, much like Mr. Gorbachev was when three KGB Generals knocked on his door that fateful Sunday evening.

Daniel Latouche is Professor of Political Science at the Institut national de la recherche scientifique in Montreal. A regular columnist with Le Devoir, he has recently published Allaire, Belanger, Campeau et les autres, a study of the various constitutional proposals in the Belanger Campeau and the Allaire Reports.